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Since the turn of the century, across North Atlantic countries, counterterrorism
law has been an area of relentless, highly prioritized, legal production that often
challenges rule of law principles. This article provides a general overview of
United Kingdom counterterrorism legislation and, drawing from jurispru-
dence, state theory, and political philosophy, constructs an analytical framework
to assess its implications for the broader shape, function, and logic of law.
It starts by assessing the dynamic tension between authoritarian and democratic
elements that constitutes modern law, thus setting the overall conceptual
framework in which counterterrorism law pertains. It proceeds to analyze U.K.
counterterrorism law, by juxtaposing it to its United States counterpart and by
deciphering the key trends into which its provisions combine. Based on this
account, the article considers the implications of counterterrorism law for the
law-form, that is, for the articulation between legal content, logic, and insti-
tutionality. It ﬁnds that, although the content and logic of counterterrorism law
are incompatible with rule of law principles, they are developed in an insti-
tutional framework adherent to the rule of law. To account for this paradox, the
article concludes that counterterrorism law signals the advent of authoritarian
legality, a reconﬁguration of the rule of law where the latter holds its insti-
tutional shape, but comes to consist of, and be driven by, authoritarian content
and purposes. The article outlines the main characteristics of authoritarian
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legality, compares it to existing approaches to counterterrorism law, and
indicates its plausibility for U.S. counterterrorism jurisprudence.
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I N TRODUCT ION
Across European and North American jurisprudence, counterterrorism law
is, arguably, the major legal development in the twenty-ﬁrst century. It is
a dynamic area of legal production; it is highly prioritized politically,
introduces novel elements—and reinstates discarded ones—into the legal
framework. Counterterrorism law has caused concern among legal scholars,
practitioners, and criminologists, who see some of its provisions as disrup-
tive of established rights, liberties, and standards. Nonetheless, critical
accounts of counterterrorism law remain partial and disjoined. At best,
they provide in-depth analysis of speciﬁc powers and show how they
contravene particular legal standards, rights, or principles. This article aims
to unify these critiques and overcome their limitations, by offering a com-
prehensive overview of United Kingdom counterterrorism law and its im-
plications for the overall shape of the jurisprudence.
To do so, the article reframes the analysis of counterterrorism law in
three respects. First, it provides a full overview of U.K. counterterrorism
legislation. This is surprisingly rare in the literature,1 possibly due to the
scattered and constantly evolving nature of U.K. counterterrorism legisla-
tion. The latter comprises eight dedicated parliamentary Acts and a mosaic
of provisions in legislation concerning crime, ﬁnance, immigration, inves-
tigation, among other areas. To overcome this difﬁculty, the article synthe-
sizes the scattered provisions into decipherable legal trends, providing thus
a broader and more systematic vista of U.K. counterterrorism law than has
hitherto been available.
Second, the article constructs a framework for the analysis of counter-
terrorism law that is broader and more deﬁned than in existing analyses.
Its outmost limits are demarcated by an assessment of modern law as
1. The only attempt to provide a broad overview that the author is aware of, is Roach
(2011, pp. 238–308); another could be pieced together by selecting sections throughout
Donohue (2008).
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constituted by the dynamic interaction between democratic and authori-
tarian tendencies. Within this broad context, the article focuses on the
implications of counterterrorism law in three interrelated but analytically
distinct registers: legal content, the ‘‘logic’’ of law (i.e., the principles and
purposes that organize and motivate the law), and its institutionality (the
respective roles, positions, and relations among the institutions that pro-
duce and implement the law). The historically speciﬁc articulation of these
elements constitutes the ‘‘law-form.’’
Third, the article concludes that, rather than inﬂicting multiple partial
infringements of the rule of law, U.K. counterterrorism law outlines a gen-
eral, systematic reshaping of the rule of law framework so that it can
accommodate legal rules and jurisprudential logic that are incompatible
with the rule of law. It signals the advent of a new law-form, authoritarian
legality, deﬁned as a reshaping of the rule of law that allows the systematic
development of authoritarian legal content and logic within its framework.
This account unfolds in ﬁve substantive sections. The ﬁrst assesses
modern juridical and political arrangements as compounds of democratic
and authoritarian elements in dynamic tension. This delimits the broadest
analytical framework to which counterterrorism law pertains, and which it
affects. The second section brieﬂy juxtaposes U.S. and U.K. counterter-
rorism law, offering an entry point to the latter to readers unfamiliar with
it. The third section deciphers the main trends of U.K. counterterrorism
law. It examines them from a criminal law vantage point, rooted in liberal
concepts of individual autonomy and freedom, and concerned with the
need for conduct and intention elements to determine guilt. Here, the
analysis draws from existing critical accounts, but also diverges from them
in three respects: it views pre-emption as the decisive master-trend in
counterterrorism law, not as one trend among many; it suggests that the
Intelligence mechanism acquires a crucial role in determining legislation;
and it highlights the political character of counterterrorism law, a feature
that is unique to it, sets it apart as an area of study, and permeates its other
trends.
The fourth section engages with the content of counterterrorism law,
the logic that underpins it, and its institutionality, to confront a paradox:
Even as counterterrorism aligns law with raison d’e´tat and enemy jurispru-
dence and is, therefore, structurally incompatible with the rule of law, it is
produced and implemented by institutions that maintain their constitu-
tional character. To address this paradox, the ﬁfth section draws from the
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jurisprudence of Franz Neumann and the state theory of Bob Jessop and
Nicos Poulantzas to advance the notion of authoritarian legality. It sees
counterterrorism law as a readjustment between the democratic and
authoritarian elements that comprise modern law, and as a reconﬁguration
of the law-form. The latter is named ‘‘authoritarian legality.’’ It is marked
by the systematic (as opposed to circumstantial or temporary) development
of authoritarian elements within the framework of the rule of law. Its
overall tendency is to amplify the coercive power of the state over society,
and concentrate it at the hands of the Executive branch. Authoritarian
legality denotes a de-formalization of law, whereupon legal content and
process become ad hoc, discretionary, and amorphous. Finally, this section
argues that the account of authoritarian legality could apply beyond the
U.K. It juxtaposes authoritarian legality to established conceptualizations
of U.S. counterterrorism law (extra-legality, state of exception, militant
democracy), and suggests that it is well suited to capture the normalization
of U.S. counterterrorism law, whereupon the latter shreds its ‘‘exceptional’’
features and increasingly operates within the constitutional framework.
The assessment of authoritarian legality is inevitably tentative, for two
reasons. First, focused as it is on legislation, this article is an abstract study
of designs and possibilities that are not necessarily fully realized. And
second, in focusing on counterterrorism law, this article addresses only
a small part of the overall legal framework. What the article strives for is
to outline the juridico-political horizon affected (and, however partially,
reshaped) by counterterrorism law and, by doing so, to deepen its critique.
I . THE DUAL CONST I TUT ION OF MODERN LAW
Before analyzing counterterrorism law, it is useful to survey the broadest
context in which it ultimately pertains and affects: the modern juridico-
political institution. In general terms, modernity is constituted on the
interface of two mutually antagonistic social projects and imaginaries. The
ﬁrst is that for collective and individual autonomy, that is, self-institution
and self-determination. It creates the aspiration for democracy, and is
expressed historically in a multitude of struggles for political freedom and
for social, economic, gender, or racial emancipation. The second is that of
rational mastery over humans and nature. This knowledge-based imaginary
seeks to manage and subdue social, animate, and dead matter to expand the
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conditions of capital accumulation. It is expressed in the development of
expertise-based bureaucratic ﬁelds that assume direction and control over
society, premised on their knowledge of ‘‘objective laws’’ that are not
created by society but determine its affairs (Castoriadis, 1997, pp. 37–39;
2007; 2015, pp. 7–8; Santos, 2002, pp. 1–20; Smith, 2014, pp. 179–182).
The tension between these imaginaries shapes the modern juridico-
political constellation. The modern state embodies autonomy insofar as
it is conceptualized as an authority stemming exclusively from—and refer-
ring exclusively to—society (rather than some extra-social institutive
source, like god). This also makes it the affair of society, thus providing
a platform for democratic politics. The state also embodies rational mastery
inasmuch as it bases its authority on its (assumed) expertise on objective
laws—of nature, history, or the market—that supposedly determine social
affairs (Boukalas, 2012, pp. 278–280; Kelsen, 1929).
This tension is impressed on the juridical institution of the state as rule
of law and as its suspension. The modern state, while maintaining the
attribute of being the sole purveyor of law, deﬁnes and limits its powers
through it. Its powers (what it can do, how, and in relation to what) are set
out in advance and rendered systematic in the form of laws that are clearly
formulated, universal, and public. In short, the meta-legal concept of the
rule of law (Loughlin, 2010, p. 314) is constitutive of the modern state and
sets it apart from other forms of political organization. Yet, the state is also
premised on its capacity to overcome, evade, and even suspend law, and to
adopt any modality and intensity of force necessary to preserve ‘‘itself’’—
that is, the social order that contains it and which it helps to (re)produce. In
short, raison d’e´tat is a co-constitutive principle of modern statehood (Santos,
2002, p. 42; Hirsch, 1978, pp. 64–65; Jessop, 2016, p. 28; Poulantzas, 1978,
pp. 84–86). In this sense, the state is a compound of legality and illegality.
As the formal expression of the relation of force between the state and
society, criminal law is a nodal point in this juridico-political arrangement.
Again, it is doubly determined. It is rooted in the concepts of individual
freedom and autonomy, which determine its core principles. Yet, rather
than a negation of state violence, criminal law is a speciﬁc conﬁguration of
it (Poulantzas, 1978, pp. 76–77). Even as it sets out to protect the individual
from arbitrary state force, it is also shaped by, and helps to safeguard,
a social order organized around the primacy of the relation of private
property (Norrie, 2001). Thus, criminal law is doubly instituted on the
grounds of liberty and security.
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The account of the juridico-political institution of modernity must, in
the conﬁnes of this article, remain brief and sketchy. But it would be
misleading without one clariﬁcation: the elements of the duality are not
mutually exclusive. They can coexist, be mutually supportive, incorporate
features of one another so that their duality is reproduced within each in
a fractal fashion, and combine into hybrid forms.
The rule of law highlights this point. Although at odds with raison d’e´tat
practices, the latter provides its ultimate support under duress. Further-
more, the rule of law constantly attempts to subjugate raison d’e´tat into its
code, producing a variety of legally deﬁned situations of state illegality
(state of siege, exception, necessity, emergency: Schmitt, 1921/2014), as well
as designs to absorb the ‘‘emergency’’ in the constitutional framework
(Ackerman, 2006).
Moreover, the rule of law is a compound of emancipation and control,
of freedom and order (Santos, 2002, p. 38; Loughlin, 2010, p. 318). The rule
of law is the contingent outcome of social struggles. It is therefore forged by
the exigencies of capitalist social relations, which it shapes, accommodates,
supports, promotes, and protects (Fine, 1984, pp. 81, 100, 105–119, 145;
Neumann, 1937, p. 109; Norrie, 2001; Pashukanis, 1929/1989; Poulantzas,
1978, pp. 63–70, 86–88). Yet, at the same time, it can protect the weaker,
subaltern social groups; it can function as a springboard for democratic
struggles; it can be stirred to egalitarian directions; and, even as a mode of
domination, it is inﬁnitely preferable to the authoritarian law of a dictator-
ship (Marx, 1867/1990, pp. 340–416; Neumann, 1937; Poulantzas, 1978,
pp. 90–92, 203–204; Thompson, 1975, pp. 258–259).
Counterterrorism law makes a modest but clear intervention in this
dynamic juridico-political ﬁeld, favoring certain elements over others. This
becomes apparent when we examine its key features and trends.
I I . COUNTERTERROR ISM LAW IN THE UN I TED
K INGDOM AND THE UN I TED STATES
In providing a comprehensive overview of U.K. counterterrorism law, this
article offers an entry point for readers unfamiliar with this subject. Thus,
before examining U.K. counterterrorism law in earnest, the article brieﬂy
juxtaposes it to that of the United States, the (arguably) most studied coun-
terterrorism jurisprudence. Without attempting a comparative account, it
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aims to help the reader navigate the U.K. material by highlighting some
similarities and differences vis-a`-vis the United States.
The North American scholar will be intrigued by the augmented powers
that the United Kingdom allows its Home Secretary to revoke a person’s
citizenship and even render him stateless—powers that have no parallel in
U.S. law. Pre-inchoate offenses, which can criminalize any conduct when it
is related to the preparation of a future terrorist act, and encouragement
offenses, which criminalize acts of expression as such, are also alien to U.S.
jurisprudence. Nonetheless, they outline an expansion of the remit of
criminal law—a trend present in U.S. counterterrorism law in the shape
of material support offenses.
U.K. and U.S. approaches to indeﬁnite detention of terrorism suspects
comprise dissimilar measures that, nonetheless, produce similar trends. In
the United States, this power materialized in presidential powers to desig-
nate suspects as enemy combatants, a deregulated regime of detention, and
pseudo-trials by ad hoc military commissions. In the United Kingdom, it
crystallized into the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures
(TPIMs). These are restrictions short of deprivation of liberty, issued by
the Home Secretary. Although extremely different in outlook and inten-
sity, both provisions aim to neutralize individuals that pose a potential
threat, and outline a parallel regime of justice controlled by the Executive
branch.
Closer alignment between the two jurisdictions is evident with regard to
due process. In both countries, due process suffers similar travails, involv-
ing closed and ex parte adjudication, based on uncontested and often secret
intelligence, which shatters the sense of equality of arms between prosecu-
tion and defense. Another area of coincidence is that of terrorism (and
criminal) investigations. Counterterrorism legislation de facto disengages
investigation from suspicion. It is set to accommodate the intelligence
agencies’ preferred ‘‘discovery approach,’’ which effectively consists of
monitoring the sum total of social activity to identify suspect behaviors
and relations. However, since late 2015, a divergence appears. In the United
States, the Freedom Act signals that there are limits to intelligence powers.
By contrast, the United Kingdom, in the Investigatory Powers Bill cur-
rently before parliament, appears committed to allow a virtually limitless
scope for intelligence.
Finally, ensuring that by ‘‘counterterrorism’’ we are comparing like for
like, the deﬁnitions of terrorism in both countries (Patriot Act and Terrorism
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Act 2000, respectively) demand a substantive act and a political motivation.
While in the U.S. deﬁnition the substantive act must be a federal offense, in
the United Kingdom actus reus is more open. And, while the United States
locates the political motivation necessary for terrorism only in the objectives
the act aims to accomplish, the United Kingdom additionally identiﬁes it in
the springs that inform the act.
Beyond speciﬁc powers and trends, deeper paradigmatic shifts are also
aligned. In both countries, counterterrorism law is shaped by the logic of
pre-emption and the exigencies of national security. It is designed to inter-
cept and neutralize terrorist threats before they materialize. This disrupts
law’s own logic and temporalities, and turns law into an instrument at the
service of security objectives. As a result, the role of the Judiciary in penal
processes is reduced, and penal processes are controlled by the Executive.
Moreover, they indicate a shift in legal subjectivity. They are dominated by
a presumption of guilt, and consider the citizen as a suspect. Finally, law
becomes overtly political in the objectives it seeks to achieve and in the
conduct it primarily targets. In counterterrorism the distinctions that
typically concern modern law—legal vs. illegal, innocent vs. guilty—are
underpinned by that between friend and enemy.
In the United States, this paradigmatic shift mainly occurred through
extra-legal measures (military and executive orders, memoranda, and
guidelines) and through exceptional powers vis-a`-vis exceptional cate-
gories of subjects (spies, aliens, enemy combatants). By contrast, in the
United Kingdom, it involved a realignment of criminal law and justice.
Yet, while in the United States the entry point for counterterrorism
powers was in the legal and constitutional periphery, these powers are
gradually incorporated into legislation and precedent (Boukalas, 2014,
pp. 76–78, 95–96). They become ‘‘normalized’’: institutionalized, system-
atic, and permanent.
This brief juxtaposition of the two counterterrorism jurisprudences
shows that, despite a disparity between speciﬁc measures, the broader
trends into which they combine are aligned. This alignment derives
from coinciding political premises (national security) and strategic
choices (pre-emption) that inform the creation of counterterrorism law.
Crucially, although this strategic shift is expressed in different, opposite
forms (criminal law in the U.K., extra-legal measures in the U.S.),
a process of alignment is underway as U.S. counterterrorism law is being
normalized.
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I I I . TRENDS : UNDO ING LEGAL I TY , PRE -EMPT ING
POL I T ICS
Comparative analysts of counterterrorism law, like Kent Roach and Claire
Macken, conclude approvingly that U.K. counterterrorism law adopts
a ‘‘criminal justice model.’’ In contrast to the ‘‘intelligence model’’ adopted
by the United States, where counterterrorism law relies considerably on
Executive and Military Orders, U.K. powers are legislated by Parliament,
are subject to judicial control, and are therefore aligned with human rights
and rule of law requirements (Macken, 2011, pp. 140, 151–153; Roach, 2011,
pp. 238–239, 306–308). Still, is the U.K. model criminal justice ‘‘as usual’’?
Deciphering its key trends is a ﬁrst step toward an answer.
A. Defining Terrorism: Criminalizing Politics
Counterterrorism law is designed to counter a crime deﬁned in political
terms. This is its deﬁning feature. The need for a general deﬁnition of
terrorism as a sui generis crime stems from the intention to penalize the
politics that inform it (Saul, 2005, pp. 82–83).
The deﬁnition of terrorism in U.K. legislation afﬁrms this. In its ﬁrst
section, the 2000 Terrorism Act (TA) deﬁnes terrorism as the ‘‘use or threat
of action’’ that involves serious violence against a person, serious damage to
property, endangers life, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of
(a section of) the public, or seriously interferes with an electronic system
(§ 1(2)); and it is ‘‘designed to inﬂuence the government’’2 or to intimidate
a section of the public, and ‘‘is made for the purpose of advancing a polit-
ical, religious3 or ideological cause’’ (§ 1(1)).
This deﬁnition presents two elements, one of conduct or effect, and one
of motivation. For terrorism to occur, both elements must be present. The
conduct element encompasses acts that threaten or damage life and, in
equal measure, acts that damage property. Moreover, it encompasses oth-
erwise lawful conduct when, regardless of intention, it could cause serious
risk (Anderson, 2011, pp. 28–29; 2014b, pp. 27–28, 76; Roach, 2004,
p. 176). Terrorism can be a violent or non-violent crime, a crime against
2. ‘‘or an international governmental organisation’’: Added by Terrorism Act 2006, § 34.
3. ‘‘racial’’: Added by Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, § 75(1)(2)(a).
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the person or against property, and can reside on intention or negligence.
Thus, terrorism is a crime that evades typiﬁcation.
By contrast, the deﬁnition is emphatic regarding the motivational ele-
ment: the political, ideological, religious, or racial motivation; or the objec-
tive to inﬂuence the policy of a government—of any government,
regardless of how oppressive it may be, in any of its policies, regardless
of how unjust, unpopular, or dangerous they may be. Thus, the deﬁnition
involves two elements that are highly unusual (and anomalous) in criminal
law: it makes motivation a constitutive element of the offense, and it
explicitly delineates it in political terms. In effect, the offense of terrorism
serves to insulate governmental policy from unwarranted popular interfer-
ence. Characteristically, although Australia and South Africa, which have
adopted deﬁnitions similar to that of the United Kingdom, explicitly
exempt public protest from their deﬁnitions, the United Kingdom does
not (Fenwick & Phillipson, 2009, p. 460; Roach, 2011, p. 306).
In the absence of a clear conduct element, political motivation becomes
the decisive aspect of the deﬁnition. Thus, the act designates politically
informed offenses as especially abhorrent (Anderson, 2014b, p. 86; Cram,
2009, p. 51), and stigmatizes the political views associated with terrorism,
regardless of which other actors espouse them and what means they employ
(Sanguinetti, 1979).
B. Legal Uncertainty: Penal Expansion
The creation of terrorism-related offenses tends to add new layers of inde-
terminacy to those resulting from the uncertain conduct element in the
general deﬁnition. The offenses of preparation and encouragement high-
light this trend.
Preparation offenses enter the counterterrorism repertoire through the
2000 TA, which criminalizes the possession of anything (‘‘substance or any
other thing’’ (§ 121)) in circumstances that give rise to reasonable suspicion
that possession is ‘‘for a purpose connected with the commission, prepa-
ration, or instigation of an act of terrorism’’ (§ 57(1)). It also criminalizes
(§ 58) the collection, recording, and possession of ‘‘information of a kind
likely to be useful’’ to a person preparing an act of terrorism. It provides
15- and 10-year maximum sentences, respectively. Similarly, the 2006 TA
provides for life imprisonment for engaging ‘‘in any conduct in preparation
for giving effect to [the] intention’’ of committing acts of terrorism (§ 5). In
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every case the onus is on the defendant to prove that possession, collection,
and preparation were undertaken for purposes other than terrorism.
The reversal of the onus of proof and their broad, unspeciﬁed actus reus
sets these preparatory offenses apart from established inchoate crimes (Ash-
worth, 2009, p. 90; Fenwick & Phillipson, 2009, p. 462; Macken, 2011,
p. 118; McSherry, 2009, pp. 142, 153). They do not reside on any speciﬁc
conduct, but on a perspective ﬁnal act, and can criminalize any conduct
leading to it, including conduct that would otherwise be lawful. By con-
structing actus reus in terms of an assumed future act, preparatory offenses
expand the temporal reach of criminal law and the range of behaviors it
encompasses. The ﬁnal act that recasts ‘‘preparatory’’ conduct as criminal,
is terrorism, and terrorism resides on political motivation. Thus, political
conviction is decisive for determining the existence of a preparatory offense
(Tardos, 2007, pp. 671–672, 676). Possibly because of their loose determi-
nation and expansive scope, preparatory offenses are broadly used as
charges in terrorism cases, and tend to secure convictions (Anderson,
2011, pp. 91–92; 2013, pp. 124–126).
Encouragement offenses are also future-oriented and expand the scope of
penalization. They apply to publishing and disseminating terrorist statements
andmaterial. TA 2006 (§ 1) creates the offense of publishing ‘‘a statement that
is likely to be understood by some or all of themembers of the public to whom
it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to
them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.’’
Regarding dissemination, § 2 outlaws the distribution, circulation, giving,
taking, selling, lending, electronic transmission (etc.) of a terrorist publication.
A ‘‘terrorist publication’’ is anything that contains ‘‘matter’’ likely ‘‘to be
understood, by some or all of the persons to whom it is or may become
available . . . as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to
them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.’’
For both offenses it is irrelevant whether anything in the statement or
publication relates to the commission, preparation, or instigation of ter-
rorist acts, or whether any person has been encouraged by the statement to
commit, prepare, or instigate such acts. Instead, the defendant has to prove
that the statement did not express his views nor had his endorsement, and
that he made this clear in all the circumstances of its publication. Thus,
encouragement offenses rely on negligence; they punish (with a seven-year
maximum sentence) the creation of a risk that someone might be encour-
aged to commit, prepare, or instigate terrorist acts.
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The very structure of these offenses challenges legal certainty. Their
actus reus is elusive. They rely mainly on the interpretation of a communi-
cation by some members of their audience. (In the case of dissemination
the audience is not actual but prospective). The audience, the decisive
factor for ‘‘encouragement,’’ is also interpreted. The offense effectively
resides in the assumed predispositions of an (actual or prospective) audi-
ence. Thus, in deﬁning offenses of encouragement, the act grants state
authorities (police, prosecutors, and courts) license to selectively prosecute
and punish expression by construing audiences and their predispositions.
Finally, the expressions that can be prosecuted as encouragement may
take any form (written or spoken word, song, music, art, performance,
etc.). They are targeted because of their political content or resonance. This
stems from the deﬁnition of terrorism. Yet, whereas the deﬁnition demands
both political ends and substantive acts, encouragement effectively does
away with the latter, to penalize political expression as such. The assurance
that the government would only rarely prosecute political protest as
encouragement (Barendt, 2009, p. 445) conﬁrms that protest is within the
remit of the offense.
C. Bypassing Criminal Law: Particularism and Punishment
without Justice
Apart from stretching the reach of criminal law, another way of extending
penalization is to bypass criminal law and deal with suspects through admin-
istrative measures and civil-criminal hybrids. Although imposing heavy sanc-
tions, these alternative routes fall short of depriving liberty. They do not
belong to criminal law, and hence they are not subject to its standards.
The stand-out specimen here is the TPIM, introduced by the 2011
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act (TPIMA). The
Home Secretary can issue a TPIM notice when she ‘‘is satisﬁed in the
balance of probabilities that the individual is or has been involved in
terrorism-related activity’’ and ﬁnds that restrictions are necessary for pro-
tecting the public (Counterterrorism and Security Act 2015, CtSA, § 20(1)).
‘‘Terrorism-related activity’’ refers to: (a) the commission, preparation or
instigation of terrorist acts; (b) any conduct intending to facilitate such acts;
(c) encouragement; or (d) ‘‘conduct which gives support or assistance to
individuals who are known or believed by the individual concerned to be
involved in terrorism-related activity’’ (TPIMA § 4(1)). The Secretary can
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impose restrictions on the individual’s belongings, activities, employment,
association, communication, ﬁnance, and travel; and obligations to regu-
larly report to the authorities, accept electronic tagging, and receive unan-
nounced visits, searches and seizures by the police (TPIMA Sch.1; CtSA §§
16–20). Breaching imposed restrictions is a criminal offense with a ten-year
maximum sentence (TPIMA § 23; CtSA § 17).
To be valid, TPIM notices must be approved by a High Court judge in
an ex parte hearing. The individual concerned is unaware of the impeding
notice and unable to make representations (TPIMA § 6(4)). The judge can
reject the notice only if it is ‘‘obviously ﬂawed’’ (§ 6(3)(a), § 6(7)) on
grounds of illegality, procedural impropriety, or irrationality. This is an
extremely high threshold for the judge, who, moreover, has no competence
to second-guess the intelligence on which the notice is based (Roach, 2011,
p. 281). The individual can appeal the notice. The appeal hearing is ex parte
and adjudicated on the basis of restricted and summary evidence, submit-
ted by the Secretary so that it does not compromise the national interest.
The appellant is represented by a Special Advocate, who is security-
cleared and appointed by the Attorney General. She represents the point
of view of the appellant, but cannot communicate with him (TPIMA
Sch.4) (Donkin, 2014, pp. 30–31, 86).
TPIMs combine civil standards of proof with sanctions the severity of
which approaches criminal punishment (Dennis, 2012; Stanton-Ife, 2012,
p. 194). They allow the Secretary to target individuals when she does not
have enough evidence to prosecute, or wishes to keep relevant evidence
secret. The sole basis of their issuing is a risk assessment conducted by the
Home Secretary (Ramsay, 2009, p. 118) through unknown procedures,
criteria, and methods. TPIMs evade legal certainty standards and can
envelop individuals with only tentative or peripheral relation to terrorism
(Anderson, 2014a, p. 49). They apply to ill-deﬁned behaviors, allowing the
Executive to penalize individuals selectively. They institute a particularistic
regime of justice that distributes sanctions tailored for each individual
(Norrie, 2009, p. 33). This parallel justice regime is fully controlled by the
Executive and reduces justice to a personal relation between the Secretary
and each suspect.
Another, more established avenue for bypassing criminal law is that of
administrative powers. Among them, powers to proscribe an organization
‘‘concerned with terrorism’’, and subsequently criminalize all its members
and associates regardless of individual wrongdoing, were set out in the 2000
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TA and expanded by the 2006 TA to include groups that encourage
terrorism without engaging in it (Cram, 2009, pp. 56–57; Fenwick &
Phillipson, 2009, pp. 460–461). Proscriptions are made on the basis of
intelligence and are recommended by intelligence agencies. They need the
assent of parliament, but Members cannot access the classiﬁed material that
informs the Secretary’s decision (Anderson, 2011, p. 32). An organization
can challenge its proscription by appealing to the Secretary and, further, to
the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC), a court of
record that adjudicates in closed hearings on the basis of secret evidence.
With POAC permission either party can make a ﬁnal appeal to the Court
of Appeals, something that has yet to happen. Charges of membership and
support of a proscribed organization were amongst the most common in
counterterrorism cases until 2008, when they declined abruptly, at least as
‘‘principal offense’’ (compare: Anderson, 2011, p. 35; 2014b, p. 66). Proscrip-
tion offenses outline a regime of guilt by association, determined by Exec-
utive decision.
Finally, the 2006 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act (§ 56)
allows the Home Secretary to deprive someone of British citizenship when-
ever she is satisﬁed that ‘‘deprivation is conducive to the public good’’—an
undeﬁned concept, determined unilaterally by the Secretary (Lavi, 2010).
Individuals can appeal at a secret immigration tribunal that replicates
the TPIMs procedure of secret evidence and ex parte hearings. Further,
the Immigration Act 2014 (§ 66) authorizes the Secretary to revoke, on the
grounds of acts ‘‘seriously prejudicial to the vital interests’’ of the state, the
citizenship of people who only have British nationality. The Secretary can
render people stateless, depriving them of all citizenship-based rights in one
stroke. Resort to citizenship revocation has markedly risen since 2010
(Rooney, 2014).
D. Due Process: No Judge, No Evidence
The trends described above undermine due process and diminish the role
of the Judiciary. Open-ended offenses undercut the trial’s substantive basis,
de facto undermining due process (Tardos, 2007, pp. 670, 675, 677). Legal
hybrids and administrative measures allow only for post festum control,
through a spectral judicial system with limited power and capacity to
ascertain truth. The exclusion of the defendant from the penal process
contravenes the ‘‘equality of arms’’ tradition, erasing a key legitimating
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feature of the criminal trial (Brants & Field, 2000). It effectively casts the
defendant as mere matter of the justice process.
The sidelining of the judiciary is largely the result of an amalgamation
between evidence and intelligence. Evidence relates to past occurrences and
pertains to a system geared toward determining guilty acts and intentions.
It is submitted in the context of a public trial, and is scrutinized and
measured against deﬁned burdens and standards of proof. Intelligence is
instrumental, conditioned by the objectives of its users. It is concerned with
future occurrences, and strives to identify threats. It is subject only to internal
veriﬁcation, and depends on secrecy. Hence, its reliability is hard to deter-
mine. It is evaluated not on the basis of legal principles and standards, but on
the severity and likelihood of the threat it describes (Donkin, 2014, pp. 8–9;
McCulloch & Pickering, 2009, p. 634; Roach, 2010, pp. 51–53).
Legal hybrids allow sanctioning on the basis of intelligence substituting
for evidence. Similarly, citizenship revocation and proscription impose
sanctions on intelligence grounds evaluated only by Executive actors
(Roach, 2010, pp. 54–55). Further, intelligence is key in identifying terrorist
purposes behind otherwise lawful acts (preparation), and the propensity of
audience members (encouragement). Thus, counterterrorism law allows
for punishment based on material that can be uncertain, unreliable, and
ﬂanked by prejudicial and politically deﬁned determinations of suspicion
(McCulloch & Pickering, 2010, p. 21; Shapiro & Cohen, 2007, pp. 128–
132). As terrorism is a political crime, intelligence typically focuses on
political conviction and activity (Boukalas, 2014, pp. 103–106, 148–149;
Donohue, 2008, p. 66; Lyon, 2003, p. 54; McCulloch & Pickering,
2010, p. 21; Ratcliffe, 2008, p. 224).
The travails of due process culminate in the 2013 Justice and Security Act
(JSA), which provides for closed material hearings in civil trials every time
the Home Secretary or an involved party requests the protection of sensi-
tive material (§ 6). Thus, closed trials are normalized, indicating a coloni-
zation of justice by the concerns of the intelligence apparatus.
E. Intelligence Law
Combined, the key trends in counterterrorism legislation marginalize the
judiciary and concentrate coercive powers in the hands of the Executive,
especially enhancing the role of Intelligence (with capital ‘‘I’’ when refer-
ring to the apparatus). Decisions to revoke citizenship or proscribe an
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organization are made on the basis of information provided by intelligence
agencies. The TPIM system was devised to protect the operationality of
Intelligence from exposure in court (Ashworth, 2009, pp. 95–99). The
proliferation of closed procedures is also meant to protect Intelligence: JSA
was designed to overcome the stringent Public Interest Immunity process
for the classiﬁcation of sensitive material in court (Hickman, 2013).
A clear conﬁrmation of Intelligence empowerment is provided by
the 2016 Investigatory Powers Act (IPA). It imposes on Communications
Service Providers (CSPs) a duty to retain communications data for up to
a year (§ 87, § 89). It thus renders permanent the regime imposed by the
2014 Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA), which, in
turn, was meant to temporarily allow expanded retention after the Euro-
pean Union Court of Justice had struck down the E.U. Directive under-
lying this power (Digital Rights Ireland, Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/
12). It also acknowledges weblogs (a user’s history of website visits) as
‘‘communications data,’’ that is, as communications trafﬁc rather than
content (§§ 61–62, § 85). Further, IPA obliges CSPs to overcome their
own encryption, either by providing the relevant keys to the authorities or
by designing security ﬂaws in their software and informing the authorities
on how to exploit them (§§ 252–253). It legalizes practices of blanket
surveillance and interception, which monitor the communications of mil-
lions of people suspected of nothing (Part 6). It acknowledges and legalizes,
including in bulk form, ‘‘equipment interference’’ practices, thus allowing
Intelligence to hack into computers, appropriate all information stored
therein, monitor them in real time, and even take over their operations
(Part 5; Part 6, Chapter 3). Crucially, the powers that IPA legislates had
been legally challenged: the retention regime maintained by DRIPA was
found (partly) unlawful by the High Court (2015 EWHC 2092 (Admin));
bulk retention of data was declared unlawful by the ECJ (C-203/15 and
C-698/15); and bulk surveillance and equipment interference are also scru-
tinized by European and U.K. courts (Anderson, 2015, pp. 203–243; also
ECtHR: Big Brother Watch et al. vs. UK; Investigatory Powers Tribunal:
Joint Cases GreeNet et al., Privacy International). The Bill undercuts these
legal challenges to grant Intelligence the powers it demands (Anderson,
2015, pp. 190–202).
The interests, rationale, and modus operandi of Intelligence shape coun-
terterrorism law. The latter is, appreciably, law created for, and by, intel-
ligence. The empowerment of Intelligence stresses the political nature of
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counterterrorism. Targeting political activity is legislated (Security Service
Act 1989) as the raison d’eˆtre of domestic intelligence agencies, whose
purpose is the protection of parliamentary democracy from threats posed
by political, industrial, or violent means (Donohue, 2008, p. 194).
F. Pre-Emption: The Master-Trend
Thus far we have seen that, through offenses with uncertain acts reus, coun-
terterrorism law disengages the offense from a speciﬁed conduct, expanding
the reach of criminal law and the behaviors that may come in its remit; and
that legal hybrids further expand the penal relation and bring due process
under duress. These trends combine to augment coercive state power over
society, and adjust the balance of power between branches of the state
bringing the Executive, spearheaded by Intelligence, to dominate penal
processes.
These trends are not parallel to one another, but form a nexus. They can
be summed up in a singular tendency: expansion and intensiﬁcation of state
coercion, combined with diminishing legal protections. This degree of coherence
is symptomatic of their common origin. They are techniques for achieving
a singular objective, the disruption of crime before it occurs: pre-emption.
Pre-emption is forceful intervention aiming to neutralize a threat. It seeks
to incapacitate an enemy by striking ﬁrst, to deny the enemy’s capacity to
attack. Its, essentially military, logic dictates that threats should be neutral-
ized as soon as possible. It envisions possibilities for future harms and targets
those seen as likely to undertake them. Hence counterterrorism law is less
concerned with evidence, prosecution, and conviction, but focuses on in-
capacitating those identiﬁed as related to potential threats (Janus, 2004, p. 2;
McCulloch & Pickering, 2009, pp. 629, 631; 2010, pp. 13–17).
Thus, defying legal certainty is essential to targeting crimes that have
not, and may never be, committed. Similarly, the temporal expansion of
criminal law is inscribed in a pre-emptive strategy, as it allows intercepting
threats even before they are formed or, in the case of encouragement,
conceived. And legal hybrids repress potential threats by restricting the
capacity of individuals to commit crimes at an undeﬁned time in the future
(Dennis, 2012, pp. 179, 187; McCulloch & Pickering, 2010, p. 19).
Adjudication determined by intelligence-based presumption of guilt,
contravenes criminal trial procedures marked by regulated procedures
stemming from a presumption of innocence (Cole & Lobel, 2007, p. 50;
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McCulloch & Carlton, 2006, p. 404); but is well suited to the purpose of
suppressing criminal potentiality.
Naturally, Intelligence, the par-excellence pre-emptive mechanism, is
most favored by pre-emptive law. All-encompassing offenses, dissociated
from speciﬁc acts, necessitate the expansion of surveillance to perpetually
scan social interactions regardless of suspicion, enabling it to discover
emerging threats.
The importance of political motivation in deﬁning terrorism helps ori-
ent pre-emption. The identiﬁcation of criminal potentiality resides in the
divergence of the politics espoused by an individual from those tolerated by
the state (Tardos, 2007, p. 684). Consequently, counterterrorism intelli-
gence typically focuses on collecting ‘‘political information’’—not doing so
would be a dereliction of duty (McCulloch & Pickering, 2009, p. 634;
Roach, 2004, p. 177).
In sum, the pre-emptive turn in criminal law entails ill-deﬁned actus reus
and disregardedmens rea. It compromises the core function of criminal law,
as it undermines its capacity to proscribe prohibited behaviors and thus
guide individuals’ conduct. Pre-emption also causes the disruption of due
process and the reversal of the burden of proof. It thus displaces the core
commitment of criminal justice, from protecting individual freedom to
protecting the social order. Thus, counterterrorism law compromises core
premises and functions of criminal law, turning the latter into a framework
enabling the selective punishment of criminal potentiality. As the latter
largely resides in political conviction, the combined effect of counterter-
rorism law is the pre-emption of antagonistic politics.
Therefore, the alleged commitment of U.K. counterterrorism law to the
‘‘criminal justice model’’ is in fact the insertion of an advanced detachment
of the anti-legal pre-emptive logic at the heart of the legal system. Rather
than jettisoning the ‘‘intelligence model,’’ U.K counterterrorism law builds
it into criminal law and justice.
I V . COUNTERTERROR ISM LAW: I TS CONTENT , LOG IC ,
AND INST I TUT IONAL I TY
Based on the above analysis, this section examines what counterterrorism
law indicates for the broader law-form: whether it is normal or exceptional,
and how it relates to the rule of law. This account is informed by the state
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theory of Bob Jessop and Nicos Poulantzas, which conceptualizes the state
(here: the law) as a social relation and as a strategic agency in the social ﬁeld,
and differentiates between normal and exceptional state-forms. It also
draws from the jurisprudence of Franz Neumann, which sees the rule of
law as a relatively plastic framework, amenable to internal reconﬁguration
according to social demands and/or state strategies.
The notion of the ‘‘law-form’’ refers to the socio-historically speciﬁc
articulation among three main relations, those between: (a) the content,
logic, and institutionality of law; (b) law and the state; and (c) law and
society (Boukalas, 2014, pp. 23–24). The analysis here focuses only on the
ﬁrst of these relations, which is more directly related to the study of
legislation. Certainly, an analysis centered on a singular area of law can
only offer partial insights into the broader law-form. The location of coun-
terterrorism law partly ameliorates this limitation: it is mostly situated in
criminal law, a legal area that regulates the relations of violence between the
state and society and, therefore, underwrites most law. Moreover, criminal
law moves in step with counterterrorism law in important ways: there are
currently twelve different kinds of restriction order (but, unlike TPIMs
they are issued by judges or magistrates: Ashworth & Zedner, 2015, pp. 75–
76); encouragement has replaced the traditional incitement offense across
the criminal spectrum (Crime and Security Act 2007 § 44–47); and the
Law Commission complains that the proliferation of preparation offenses
has become ‘‘opportunistic,’’ resulting in over-extension of the reach of
criminal law (Ashworth & Horder, 2013, p. 467). In the administration of
justice, full trial is increasingly substituted by ‘‘summary justice’’ instru-
ments (guilty pleas, reprimands, cautions, and Penalty Notices for Disor-
der: Young, 2008; Zedner, 2009); and there has been some ill-fated
experimentation with indeﬁnite, risk-based sentencing in the form of the
Imprisonment for Public Protection scheme (Zedner, 2012). Beyond crim-
inal law, ad hoc, particularistic, and vague legislation, and marginalization
of the judiciary have been mainstays in commercial law (Cutler, 1995; 2003,
p. 237; Dezalay & Garth, 1996; Scheuerman, 1999, 2001; Scott, 2004).
Although in those areas they involve a movement away from public and
toward private law and quasi-legal arrangements (Sugarman, 2000), coun-
terterrorism jurisprudence introduces them into public law.
The key question regarding the law-form described by counterterrorism
jurisprudence is whether it is normal or exceptional. To answer it, the
starting point is the distinction between normal and exceptional forms of
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state. The state comprises democratic and authoritarian elements. In nor-
mal forms, democratic elements are predominant, and dictatorial ones take
a secondary role. In exceptional forms, authoritarian elements predomi-
nate, bringing an abrupt augmentation of state force over society.
Normal forms (e.g., liberal-parliamentary democracy, welfare-
administrative state) are characterized by a formal separation of the state
from civil society and a separation of powers within the state. These separa-
tions are regulated by law. Succession in government occurs regularly in
a multiparty system through general suffrage. Society raises its demands to
the state through institutional channels. These arrangements pertain to
a social arrangement that enjoys broad consensus regarding its core pre-
mises, while allowing for changing conﬁgurations of power among social
forces. Their capacity to accommodate social change through relatively
peaceful, institutionalized processes renders normal forms resilient and
durable (Jessop, 2016, pp. 213–215; Poulantzas, 1968, pp. 229–252, 296–303).
By contrast, exceptional forms (e.g., fascism, military dictatorships) take
over when the predominant mode of social organization is unstable. They
cancel elections and undermine the separation of powers, concentrating
state power in the hands of the Executive. They disrupt the separation of
the state from civil society and subject the latter to state control. They
suppress social antagonism, which makes them unstable and brittle (Jessop,
2016, pp. 216–221; Poulantzas, 1974, pp. 313–329; 1976).
As they represent relatively stable arrangements among social forces,
normal state-forms tend to exercise power in predictable ways, on the basis
of formal law within a constitutional framework. Exceptional forms repre-
sent interventions in an unstable situation, and therefore resort to arbitrary
power, expressed in ad hoc statutes and Executive decrees, that cancel
democratic freedoms and the rule of law (Jessop, 2016, pp. 218–220; Neu-
mann, 1936/1986; Poulantzas, 1978, pp. 87–92).
Adherence to the rule of law is therefore the key criterion in differen-
tiating between exceptional and normal states at the juridical register.
Hence, this article proceeds to evaluate the proximity of the content, logic,
and institutionality of counterterrorism legislation to rule of law principles.
A. Content: Perish the Rule of Law
In all its variations, the concept of the rule of law entails limits to state
power over society and the individual. Although biased toward an
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organization of social relations favorable to capitalism, the rule of law is
more than a capitalist construct. It incorporates popular demands for
democracy and social equality (Fine, 1984, pp. 21–22; Neumann, 1937;
Poulantzas, 1978, pp. 82–84). In other words, the rule of law is a modern
phenomenon, and therefore contains and expresses in juridico-political
terms a synthesis between the project of capitalist rational mastery and
that of emancipation.
The stalwarts of classic liberal thought (Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu,
Kant) regard the protection of individual freedom from arbitrary state force
as the foundation of the legal system. Every element of the rule of law
follows from a presumption in favor of freedom (Neumann, 1937, p. 111).
Individual freedom entails the requirement that state action should rest on
norms that are, as much as possible, general, clear, public, prospective, and
stable. The principle of freedom pre-supposes the autonomous individual.
Individual autonomy is arguably the fundamental concept of modernity,
and the core of the legal system. It implies that the individual is an end in
itself, and cannot be treated as a means to an end, personal or collective
(Stamatis, 2011, pp. 259, 395–396). Thus, autonomy constitutes a limit to
mastery over humans.
In producing law, the imperative for universality is a fundamental meth-
odological criterion (Stamatis, 2011, p. 223–224). The requirement for clar-
ity and universality conditions the capacity of the Legislature to produce
law: particularistic and unclear law is equivalent to irregular decree, for it
allows Executive actors to act arbitrarily (Neumann, 1937, pp. 106–107;
Scheuerman, 1994, p. 69). Counterterrorism legislation deﬁes the request
for clarity by creating a system of vague offenses. On the basis of offenses
designed to cover an unlimited range of behaviors, actual penalization
depends on Executive selection. Along with personalized regimes of pun-
ishment, they designate a particularistic jurisprudence that circumvents the
request for universality. Counterterrorism legislation permits punishment
to be imposed regardless of the individual’s actions and intentions. It thus
undermines individual autonomy to enhance the achievement of state
purposes (Norrie, 2001, p. 209).
In applying the law, the request for an act that contravenes existing law,
the individualization of culpability, the respect of basic rights, and judi-
cially overviewed, fair procedures are essential to the rule of law. Judicial
processes are based on the presumption of innocence, which informs the
standards and criteria regulating the stages of adjudication, ending with the
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imposition of punishment proportionate to the infraction of the law.
Counterterrorism jurisprudence dismantles this process. The vagueness
of its offenses neutralizes the fundamental nulle crimen principle. Its pre-
emptive character reverses the temporalities of the justice system. The
combination of pre-emptive targeting and ill-deﬁned offenses establishes
a judicial process based on presumption of guilt. By substituting intelli-
gence for evidence and by marginalizing the Judiciary from the process that
was its core competence, counterterrorism law brings criminal justice under
Executive control. The incompatibility of counterterrorism legislation with
the rule of law is demonstrated when attempts to align pre-emptive mea-
sures with the rule of law (e.g., by introducing judicial control) produce
new incompatibilities (e.g., secret courts) that further dissolve the rule of
law fabric.
Pre-emption reorients the justice system away from determination of guilt
and toward identifying dangerous individuals and repressing their threaten-
ing potentiality (Janus, 2004, p. 1; Macken, 2011, p. 120). The determination
of dangerousness is based on assessments of patterns of behavior, demo-
graphic and socio-economic features, mental outﬁt, and the like (Lacey,
2016; Zedner, 2012, p. 224). Instead ofWhat have you done?, criminal justice
asks Who are you? (Foucault, 2008, p. 34). Counterterrorism law locates this
dangerous potentiality on political conviction. The latter becomes a main
consideration of the law, often separating the criminal from the lawful.
Criminal justice now asks What is your vision of a good society?
B. The Logic of Law: Raison d’E´tat
These last observations point beyond legal content, to the ‘‘logic’’—the
ideas, principles, purposes, and calculi—that motivates the law. Criminal
law has, innately, a preventive function. By assigning conducts that are
punishable regardless of who undertakes them, it seeks to prevent them
from occurring. Moreover, preventive considerations and techniques have
been mainstays of criminal justice virtually throughout modernity. This is
evident in the targeting and punishment of behaviors associated with the
‘‘dangerous class’’ and, over the last forty years, in statistical assessments of
risk as a sentencing factor (Ashworth & Zedner, 2015, pp. 29–50; Zedner,
2009, pp. 35–44).
Nonetheless, although prevention dominates entire eras, it was largely
subdued between the second half of the nineteenth century and the 1970s
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(Ashworth & Zedner, 2015, p. 50). This thaw coincides with the long rise of
emancipatory struggles, expressed in recurring labor, women, youth, race,
decolonization, and democracy movements (Lacey, 1998; Norrie, 2001,
p. 27). It seems that reactive criminal law tends to correspond to demo-
cratic arrangements, whereas preventive criminal law trends relate to state
attempts to shape and control society while excluding it from the process.
Counterterrorism expresses a further shift, from prevention to pre-
emption. Whereas prevention seeks to intervene in (partly identiﬁed) causes
of crime, pre-emption has unknowability as its ontological condition. It
seeks to thwart the ontogenic potential of unidentiﬁed enemies and threats
before they emerge (Krasmann, 2007, p. 307; Massumi, 2015, pp. 5–14, 27,
30). And, whereas preventive risk-management occulted the political char-
acter of legal considerations under a cloak of technical neutrality (Zedner,
2009, p. 44), pre-emption is overwhelmingly and explicitly political: in its
targeting, operation, and objective.
Pre-emption represents a shift from ‘‘risk management’’ to ‘‘precau-
tion’’—that is, punishment of potential future harms not on the basis of
knowledge, but on that of uncertainty (Zedner, 2009, pp. 45–56). It in-
troduces in criminal law the precautionary principle, which requires the
state to act against threats that are believed to be catastrophic, but about
which speciﬁc knowledge is scarce or contested. Transplanted into criminal
law, the precaution principle no longer constrains or obliges the Executive,
but grants it license. Moreover, from substances and micro-organisms with
relatively determinate qualities and potentialities, the principle comes to
apply to people. It treats the latter as if they were the former, cancelling the
conceptual space for autonomy. And even as ‘‘society’’ or ‘‘the population’’
is the object-for-protection for both the precautionary principle and coun-
terterrorism law, due to its political character counterterrorism law also
locates the subject of the threat in society. Applied to humans, the precau-
tionary principle becomes a security imperative.
Its capturing by security dissolves law’s specifying logic and reduces it to
a political instrumentality (Aradau & Munster, 2008, pp. 33–35; McCul-
loch & Pickering, 2010, p. 14). In the legislative process, this instrumenta-
lization means that considerations with legal soundness and compatibility
with democratic rights and freedoms are replaced by concerns with law’s
effectiveness in combating terrorism (McGarrity & Williams, 2010, pp.
132–143). The logic of criminal justice is also compromised. Its concern
with impartiality, institutional independence, and detachment from
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political objectives gives way to a partisan logic deﬁned by sharp distinc-
tions between friend and enemy (McCulloch & Pickering, 2009, p. 631).
Security redraws legal subjectivities. Law sees the individual as, primarily,
a potential threat—and imposes strict liability, presumption of guilt, and
obligations to refrain from unspeciﬁed conducts.
By defying the criminal law requirement that offenses are clearly
deﬁned, and duties precisely set out, for their infringement to constitute
an offense (Roxin, 2000, pp. 61–64), counterterrorism law fails to deter or
guide individuals’ conduct. Instead, it implicitly imposes an amorphous
obligation on them to perpetually reassure the authorities that they do not
represent a threat (Aradau & Munster, 2008, p. 31; Lavi, 2010, pp. 405–406;
Ramsay, 2009, pp. 120–121, 132). Underlying counterterrorism law is the
jurisprudence of the enemy, developed by Gu¨nther Jakobs.
For Jakobs, the social function of criminal law is to generate and uphold
expectations of conduct, thus enabling mutual trust among individuals in
societies where most interactions are impersonal. To fulﬁl this function, it
is necessary that individuals display ‘‘loyalty’’ to the law, that is, readiness to
follow its norms and the outward appearance of doing so. This posture is
essential to reassure fellow citizens that the law will be obeyed, thus freeing
them from the constant worry of being wronged. On this basis, Jakobs
identiﬁes two kinds of criminal and proposes a different treatment for each.
The circumstantial criminal generally carries himself in accordance to legal
norms; his crime is a failure to comply on a speciﬁc occasion. He therefore
remains a person-in-law, and his punishment aims at his rehabilitation. By
contrast, the systematic offender exhibits disregard of the law. She assaults
the legal order per se, and hence excludes herself from the judicial order. She
is not a citizen, but an enemy. Accordingly, legal rules and protections do
not apply to her. The state is obliged to use all force necessary to neutralize
the threat she represents, even before it materializes; and its effectiveness in
doing so is the only criterion for its actions (Jakobs, 2003, 2011; also:
Krasmann, 2007, pp. 303–304; Ohana, 2010, pp. 726–727, 741, 745).4
‘‘Enemy penology is thus warfare’’ (Jakobs, 2000, in Krasmann, 2007, p.
303). The duty to reassure does not belong to the constellation of the rule of
4. This approach to criminal law has lineage in reactionary legal and political theory,
starting with Nietzche, who saw penal law as war measures used to rid oneself of the enemy
(Kirchheimer, 1940, p. 172), and culminating with Schmitt (2007) banishing the partisan
from the spheres of law and morality.
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law, but to that of raison d’e´tat. Rights are conditional on its fulﬁlment.
This means that access to rights is perpetually reviewed by the state, and
depends on citizens’ compliance. Although Jakobs ‘‘sociologically’’ de-
scribes the duty to reassure as a relationship between citizens, it is in fact
a relationship between them and the state, and outlines an organization of
political power. The conditionality of rights makes them a possession of the
state, negating individual autonomy (or any other constitutive principle
outside the state). It threatens a relapse to pre-modern relations of power
centered on the sovereign, with the individual reduced to power’s object
(Bobbio, 1996, pp. 39–43, 65).
But what is ‘‘it’’ that the individual should not represent a threat to? An
answer comes from a 2005 parliamentary debate of the Immigration bill: ‘‘In
current legislation, such actions are expressed in terms of disloyalty or dis-
affection towards theCrown, or as unlawful trade or communicationwith an
enemy in time of war. Those expressions . . . have become dated and perhaps
fail to reﬂect the full width of activity that might threaten our democratic
institutions and our way of life.’’5 Leaving aside the reference to treason and
war that ﬁrmly places us in raison d’e´tat territory, we see that what counter-
terrorism law strives to protect is ‘‘our democratic institutions and ourway of
life.’’ These are astonishingly broad terms—especially the latter, which can
be interpreted in unlimited ways. Yet, the combination of the way of life and
political institutions comprises ‘‘the social order,’’ which is elevated to the
status of a legal good to be protected by force (Kirchheimer, 1940, p. 173). In
this light, citizens’ ‘‘reassurance’’ duty consists of reassuring the state of their
compliance with the existing system of social and political relations.
C. Institutional Framework: The Rule of Law Prevails
Counterterrorism law constitutes a reversal of rule of law premises. This
reversal is not circumstantial, but expresses a strategic realignment of law:
its militancy in defense of the social order as the latter is deﬁned by the
state. Nonetheless, counterterrorism law presents a paradox, which is,
arguably, its most remarkable feature: the reversal of legal practice, con-
cepts, and objectives is meticulously codiﬁed in legislation. Promptly and
consistently, the state codiﬁes its unregulated powers and the spectral
5. Proceedings of the House of Commons Standing Committee, Committee Sessions 27;
cited in Lavi (2010, p. 407) (emphasis added).
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crimes to which they apply, in law. Executive actors do not overstep the
legal framework, but expand it so that it can allow for the actions they want
to take.
Counterterrorism law does not entail a state in a decisionist rampage,
attempting to cancel or suspend the liberal-democratic legal order, break or
bypass the law. Instead, the institutional shell of the rule of law remains
intact. Counterterrorism law is created by Parliament, observing the pro-
cesses of consultation, drafting, deliberation, debate, review by the Lords,
voting. Parliament regularly reviews and amends the laws it makes. Even
when laws are passed through emergency procedures, this is done with
parliamentary consent, for parliament maintains its capacity to resist Exec-
utive infringement. In implementing the law, the courts are almost always
present, even if post-hoc and in the shape of secret tribunals. The formal
independence of the judiciary is maintained, and so is its capacity to have
the ﬁnal word regarding all cases involving terrorism offenses and measures.
Yet, while parliament legislates unobstructed, it does so without know-
ing, strictly speaking, what it is legislating about. It knows nothing about
the threat it strives to counter, except whatever Intelligence discloses to it
via the Home Secretary. Similarly, the independent Judiciary reviews, and
has the ﬁnal say on, penal procedures, but does so on the basis of open-
ended offenses and has limited power to overrule Executive decisions or
scrutinize intelligence evidence. Apparently, even with regard to the insti-
tutional framework, the adherence to the rule of law is merely a spectacle.
Still, these formal attributes are important. There is nothing stopping
parliament from repealing any (or all) counterterrorism provisions, and the
Judiciary’s insistence on having the last word (‘‘it is not legal until I said it
is’’) shows that, even if crippled, the Judiciary maintains its claim to
monopoly on determining legality. In doing so, it maintains a key element
of the logic that speciﬁes it (Bourdieu, 2015, p. 320). The persistence of
these ‘‘formalities’’ inﬂuences the production and the application of law.
Even if legitimizing the Executive is the only thing the other branches do,
legitimation still entails a degree of limitation.
V . TOWARD AUTHOR I TAR IAN LEGAL I TY?
To the extent that we can extrapolate from a single area of law, counterter-
rorism law indicates a reconﬁguration of the law-form. The overall tendency
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of this ‘‘authoritarian legality’’ is the augmentation of coercive state power
over society, combined with diminished legal protections. This power is
concentrated at the Executive, motivated by the logic of raison d’e´tat, stra-
tegically pre-emptive, and primarily concerned with antagonistic politics.
Coercive powers are codiﬁed in open-ended provisions that disengage
penalization from the criminal act, and describe a particularist law depen-
dent on Executive discretion. They redeﬁne due process by limiting the
role of the Judiciary, augmenting the role of Intelligence, and reversing the
presumption of innocence. Legal provisions grant license, rather than pose
limits, to Executive power.
This potentially chaotic system is made coherent by its political charac-
ter. Political conviction is a key factor for suspicion and criminalization,
and society is requested to demonstrate compliance with the existing social
order. Law loses its specifying rationale and purpose and becomes an
instrument for the political project of security. As law is overwhelmed by
politics; its categories cyclically fold back upon themselves in a self-referential
loop. Outlining a closed jurisprudence, law’s purpose of securing the social
order directly determines its content and practice, and becomes the criterion
for its evaluation.
This indicates an exceptional law-form, and a decline of law as a mode of
regulation of state-society relations. Yet, the political overwhelming of law,
its subjugation to security, and the reversal of rule of law content, rationale,
and functions, are all expressed in law. State-society relations are codiﬁed in,
and regulated by, law, and the state expresses its power through law. More-
over, law is reproduced according to its own norms, not through external
channels and agencies as is typical in exceptional-dictatorial forms (Buckel,
2011, pp. 164–165). This endows the law-form with elasticity and stability.
Thus, while developing authoritarian trends and organizing them in
a relatively coherent whole, counterterrorism law does not signify the
advent of an exceptional form. Exceptional elements are developing within
the framework, and under the dominance, of normal ones. It is an ‘‘inter-
nal’’ reconﬁguration of the normal form of law. Thus (following Poulant-
zas’s outline of the state-form emerging in the 1970s), we may say that
authoritarian legality is both ‘‘better’’ and ‘‘worse’’ than an exceptional
form, whose violence would be much more broadcast and intense, but
whose temporal horizon would be limited (Poulantzas, 1978, pp. 208–209).
Whereas normal forms express a relatively stable social arrangement that
can, through institutional channels, accommodate social change without
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risking collapse, compared with exceptional forms, which signify forceful
state action when existing institutions cannot cope with social antagonism,
authoritarian legality indicates a state that claims monopoly over (legiti-
mate) politics and processes of social change, but does so through and within
legal and constitutional arrangements. Authoritarian legality is a hardening of
the rule of law framework that enables the state to pre-empt political crisis
without breaking the legal-constitutional cast (Boukalas, 2015; Jessop, 2016,
pp. 222–236).
Finally, authoritarian legality realigns the constitutive elements of mod-
ern juridical forms, favoring the project of mastery upon society over that
of social emancipation. The principles of individual autonomy and free-
dom retreat, and criminal law is deﬁned primarily as security, as defense of
the social order.
V I . AUTHOR I TAR IAN LEGAL I TY BEYOND THE UN ITED
K INGDOM
Although this account of authoritarian legality is drawn exclusively from
U.K. legislation, it could apply to counterterrorism law beyond the United
Kingdom. This is evident when it is compared, in abstract, to established
critical accounts of counterterrorism law that were mainly developed with
reference to the United States. First among them is the permanent state of
exception thesis, which sees counterterrorism law as a revelation of the true
nature of power that reduces law to sovereign force (Agamben, 2005). This
account is triggered by a singular feature of U.S. counterterrorism law: the
treatment of enemy combatants. It focuses exclusively on legal logic, ignor-
ing legal content and institutional arrangements. Moreover, whereas
authoritarian legality sees law as a social relation and is concerned with its
present conﬁguration, the state of exception thesis is concerned with
accounting for the trans-historical structure of power (Agamben, 1998,
2005), and treats counterterrorism law as evidence thereof. Finally, whereas
the permanent exception thesis attributes jurisprudential supremacy to the
exception (thus rendering itself a jurisprudential impossibility), authoritar-
ian legality also stresses the continuing importance of normal elements in
the conﬁguration of the legal ﬁeld.
A second, more exegetic than critical, account of counterterrorism
law across several countries is that of militant democracy, which sees
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counterterrorism law as the temporary suspension of speciﬁc constitutional
rights by democracies under duress (Loewenstein, 1937; Sajo´, 2004). It sees
counterterrorism law as a narrow, temporal shift in legal content and
ignores its implications for the logic or institutionality of law. Thus, despite
its invocation of democracy, it does not raise the political question under-
pinning counterterrorism law. Regardless of the infringements of their
constitutions, the (Western) countries under consideration are always,
self-evidently, democratic and liberal. By contrast, in addressing not only
the content, but also the logic and institutionality of law, authoritarian
legality allows space for the political question regarding the nature of the
polity that produces and employs such law. Finally, their constitutional
framing prevents militant democracy accounts from correctly reading the
legal content they focus on. More than a partial, temporary suspension of
speciﬁc democratic rights, counterterrorism law signiﬁes their (permanent)
conditionality and amorphy.
More advanced jurisprudentially, but also conﬁned in the constitutional
framework, are extra-legality accounts, concerned with the sidestepping by
the Executive of legal restrictions through invocation of emergency powers
(Gross, 2003; Roach, 2011, pp. 198–235). Although they provide powerful
critical assessments of counterterrorism law, they are systematically selec-
tive regarding the content they examine. Thus, they consider legislatively
enacted powers as unproblematic—including the FISA amendments that
permit U.S. Intelligence to monitor the entirety of the citizenry’s social
interactions, and the entire U.K. counterterrorism ediﬁce (Roach, 2011, pp.
175–198, 238–239, 306–308). Whereas extra-legality can be a feature of
authoritarian legality, the latter is a broader concept, able to account for
situations where exceptional powers do not enter the legal framework qua
exceptional, but are codiﬁed in normal statutes. In this sense, the account
of counter-law, comprising both extra-legal measures and legal ones that
reverse rule of law principles (Ericson, 2007), is closer to authoritarian
legality. Yet, while the counter-law approach successfully addresses the
content of law, it fails to appreciate that it does not constitute merely an
infringement of certain principles, but their displacement by a different
motivating logic. It thus offers a powerful critique of counterterrorism law,
but does not fully appreciate its character.
Not only the theory, but also the actuality of U.S. counterterrorism law
indicates the relevance of authoritarian legality. Key legal trends and the
deeper shifts in legal logic that inform the account of authoritarian legality
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are present in U.S. counterterrorism law: undermining of legal certainty,
expansion of the scope of penalization, disruption of due process, develop-
ment of parallel penal regimes, increased Executive control over justice
processes, instrumentalization of law to the service of security, pre-
emption, disruption of autonomy, recasting of legal subjectivities as threat-
ening, and overt politicization of legal meaning, objectives, and targets—they
are all present in U.S. as well as U.K. counterterrorism law. So is the overall
tendency of authoritarian legality: augmentation of state power over society,
combined with decline of legal protections.
Crucially, in the United Kingdom, the authoritarian realignment of the
rule of law is effectuated through arrangements that maintain their consti-
tutional shape. In this respect, the United States is more problematic, as
Commander in Chief powers are a considerable part of the counterterror-
ism arsenal, indicating the partial relapse to decisionism captured by extra-
legality approaches. Yet, rather than openly antagonizing the constitution,
the Executive sought to constitutionally justify even its most extreme
powers. Like the United Kingdom, the United States did not rupture its
juridico-political institutions, but reconﬁgured them to accommodate an
expansion of state power over society.
Thus, via different routes, the United Kingdom and the United States
arrive at the same destination: a law-form that systematically develops
authoritarian elements within the institutional framework of the rule of
law. Crucially, over the last eight years, the United States is gradually
shredding its most extra-legal powers (e.g., license to torture), or reigning
them in the constitutional framework (e.g., enemy combatants) (Boukalas,
2014, pp. 102–116; Greenberg, 2016, pp. 173–262). As U.S. counterterrorism
law becomes normalized, authoritarian legality provides a suitable frame-
work for critically assessing it, for it underlines the possibility that even
fully constitutional powers may be hollowing out the rule of law.
CONCLUS ION
This article has outlined a new perspective for the analysis of counterter-
rorism law. It consists, on the one hand, in deciphering the general line of
force (the ‘‘trends’’) into which the multitude of speciﬁc provisions com-
bine, and on the other, in accounting for its implications in three registers:
legal content, logic, and institutionality. The conﬁguration and articulation
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of these three elements comprises the law-form, the integrity (or internal
unity) of law in a speciﬁc socio-historical conjuncture. In turn, the con-
ﬁguration of the law-form affects the dynamic between authoritarian and
democratic tendencies that marks modern law. The discussion of U.K.
counterterrorism legislation in this framework permits an accounting of
it in its totality and an appreciation of the breadth and depth of its im-
plications. While focused on U.K. counterterrorism law, this analytical
framework could be employed to produce comprehensive analysis of coun-
terterrorism law in other jurisdictions.
With regard to U.K. counterterrorism law, the article ﬁnds that it con-
stitutes an augmentation of coercive state power over society, and concen-
trates this power at the Executive. This is not effectuated by infringement
of legal rights, nor by imposing draconian punishments, but through
a wholesale deregulation of criminal law. The latter is driven by the stra-
tegic turn to pre-emption (which also upgrades the role of Intelligence in
legal processes, including the production of law) and is designed to directly
and primarily target political conviction. These trends describe legal con-
tent that infringes core rule of law principles; they outline a logic of raison
d’e´tat that treats law as an instrument for pursuing security, but also ema-
nate from, and are applied by, an institutional assemblage that is consti-
tutional and compliant with the rule of law. On the face of this paradox,
the article suggests that counterterrorism law signals a reconﬁguration of
the law-form that keeps the institutional shape of the rule of law intact, but
allows the systematic growth of authoritarian content and logic within its
frame. It captures this reconﬁguration of the law-form in the term author-
itarian legality.
Finally, the article argues that the notion of authoritarian legality could
be relevant to the analysis of counterterrorism law beyond the United
Kingdom. It does so by brieﬂy comparing authoritarian legality to estab-
lished accounts of counterterrorism law—accounts that were mainly devel-
oped in relation to the United States. In every case, authoritarian legality is
seen as a more comprehensive account, one that permits examination of
‘‘more’’ law in more registers, providing thus a deeper understanding of its
character and effects. Further, the article addresses the current stage of U.S.
counterterrorism law, marked by its ‘‘normalization,’’ its gradual inscrip-
tion in the constitutional framework. Here, authoritarian legality is ideally
suited to account for the development of authoritarian elements within an
institutional environment aligned with the constitution and the rule of law.
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It also admonishes that even its full constitutionalization does not guaran-
tee that counterterrorism law has lost its authoritarian character.
Authoritarian legality merges the rule of law and raison d’e´tat. The
former becomes the framework for the development of the latter. If coun-
terterrorism jurisprudence realigns the law-form, it does not thereby create
an exceptional law-form, but, precisely, one that has no need for ‘‘excep-
tions.’’ Here, illegality, in the shape of arbitrary state force, becomes the
content of law, and raison d’e´tat becomes the animating principle of the
rule of law. If the rule of law is a juridico-political aspiration to reconcile
freedom with order, the former has become conditional to the demands of
the latter—and is therefore eclipsed.
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